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Abstract
Regional adversarial attacks often rely on compli-
cated methods for generating adversarial pertur-
bations, making it hard to compare their efficacy
against well-known attacks. In this study, we
show that effective regional perturbations can be
generated without resorting to complex methods.
We develop a very simple regional adversarial
perturbation attack method using cross-entropy
sign, one of the most commonly used losses in
adversarial machine learning. Our experiments on
ImageNet with multiple models reveal that, on av-
erage, 76% of the generated adversarial examples
maintain model-to-model transferability when the
perturbation is applied to local image regions. De-
pending on the selected region, these localized
adversarial examples require significantly less Lp
norm distortion (for p ∈ {0, 2,∞}) compared to
their non-local counterparts. These localized at-
tacks therefore have the potential to undermine
defenses that claim robustness under the afore-
mentioned norms.
1. Introduction
Recent advancements in the field of machine learning (ML)
— more specifically, in deep learning (DL) — have sub-
stantially increased the adoption rate of automated systems
in everyday life (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; He et al., 2016;
Xie et al., 2017). However, since their inception, these
systems have been criticized for their lack of interpretabil-
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Figure 1. (Top) An input image and its adversarial counterpart
created with IFGS. (Center and bottom) Perturbation localization
grids illustrated with black-gray images and adversarial examples
generated by IFGS when the perturbation is only applied to the grey
areas in the localization grids. Lp norms of the perturbation are
provided under each image. All of the adversarial examples were
generated using AlexNet and successfully transfer to ResNet-50.
ity: it is often difficult or impossible to know precisely
why an ML model produces a specific response for a given
input, yet such information is highly relevant in many set-
tings (Ghorbani et al., 2017; Kindermans et al., 2017). One
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
03
19
8v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  7
 Ju
l 2
02
0
Regional Image Perturbation Reduces Lp Norms of Adversarial Examples While Maintaining Model-to-model Transferability
manifestation of this shortcoming of current ML theory
to understand DL models is the phenomenon of adversar-
ial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013), which has recently
received much attention in the research community. Adver-
sarial examples are data points specifically crafted by an
adversary in order to force machine learning models into
making mistakes. Often, these artificial examples are vi-
sually indistinguishable from natural data points, making
it almost impossible for humans to detect them and call-
ing into question the generalization ability of deep neural
networks (DNN) (Schmidt et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2019).
Formally, adversarial examples are usually defined as fol-
lows (Szegedy et al., 2013; Madry et al., 2017). Given an
ML model f and an input X , an adversarial example X˜
satisfies (1) ‖X − X˜‖p ≤ ε for some chosen Lp norm and
perturbation budget ε > 0 and (2) f(X) 6= f(X˜). In other
words, the perturbed input X˜ must be “close” to the original
input X as measured by an Lp norm and the classifier f
must output different labels for X and X˜ . However, for
sufficiently small values of ε, the two inputs are indistin-
guishable and should belong to the same class. Hence, the
existence of adversarial examples for very small perturba-
tion budgets indicates a failure of DL models to accurately
capture the data manifold. Interestingly, depending on the
attack used, adversarial examples can be highly transfer-
able: an adversarial sample X˜ that fools a certain classifier
f can also fool completely different classifiers trained for
the same task (Papernot et al., 2016; Cheng et al., 2019).
This so-called transferability, i.e., the degree to which an ad-
versarial sample can fool other models, is a popular metric
for assessing the effectiveness of a particular attack.
Through the generations of research in computer vision it
was established that certain regions of images are more im-
portant for the identification of an object of interest than
others (Moravec, 1981; Schmid & Mohr, 1997; Lowe, 2004;
Sun et al., 2014; Springenberg et al., 2014; Selvaraju et al.,
2016). As such, research on localized adversarial attacks
also shows that adversarial perturbation applied to these
important regions may change the prediction faster and with
less Lp perturbation than attacks that apply the perturbation
to the entire image (Su et al., 2017; Karmon et al., 2018;
Xu et al., 2018; Zajac et al., 2019). However, analyses to
prevent adversarial examples often do not evaluate robust-
ness against such regional attacks. Adversarial defenses are
often studied exclusively against well-understood attacks
such as FGS (Goodfellow et al., 2014), JSMA (Papernot
et al., 2015), IFGS (Kurakin et al., 2016), Carlini & Wag-
ner’s Attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2016), PGD (Madry et al.,
2017), and BPDA (Athalye et al., 2018), where these attacks
apply their perturbations to the entire image based on the
magnitude of the loss gradient for each pixel and accord-
ing to the Lp norm constraints they set. We believe this
lack of evaluation against regional attacks is because (1)
regional attacks are often studied in permissive white-box
settings which do not represent real-world scenarios and (2)
the proposed attacks usually come with a completely new
and complicated way of generating adversarial examples,
thus making it not straightforward to apply these attacks
to different datasets, especially not locally, as opposed to
well-understood attacks.
In this work, we show that so-called “global” adversarial
attacks can be easily modified to become localized attacks.
As such, different from previous research efforts on local-
ized perturbation, our study does not propose a novel attack.
Instead, we introduce a general method for localizing the
perturbations generated by existing non-localized attacks.
We achieve this by multiplying the original perturbations
by a simple binary mask (as shown in Figure 1), restrict-
ing the perturbation to specific image regions. We analyze
both the transferability and the Lp norm properties of the
crafted adversarial examples, finding that the localized ex-
amples are about as effective as the examples generated by
the original attacks (in terms of transferability), and with
the localized versions often requiring significantly less Lp
distortion. The implementation of the proposed method is
publicly available1.
The finding that we can significantly reduce the required Lp
distortion while maintaining similar levels of effectiveness
potentially undermines many existing defenses — certified
or not — since these usually guarantee robustness against
specific Lp perturbation budgets (Wong & Kolter, 2017;
Croce et al., 2018; Andriushchenko & Hein, 2019; Ghiasi
et al., 2020). Reducing the required distortion attacks below
such thresholds could render these defenses ineffective.
2. Framework
Data Adversarial examples are mainly studied on
MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998), CIFAR (Krizhevsky & Hinton,
2009), or ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015). However,
as the field of adversarial machine learning evolved, due to
shortcomings in terms of color channels and image sizes,
the MNIST and CIFAR datasets are not deemed to be suit-
able for studies that represent real-world scenarios where
adversarial examples pose a threat (Carlini & Wagner, 2017).
Following this observation, we use images taken from the
test set of the ImageNet dataset in order to generate adver-
sarial examples.
Models Although convolutional architectures were already
used in the work of LeCun et al. (1998), it was the suc-
cess of AlexNet in 2012 that popularized DNN architec-
tures (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). Recent research in the field
of adversarial robustness also revealed AlexNet to be one
1 github.com/utkuozbulak/
regional-adversarial-perturbation
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of the more robust architectures (Su et al., 2018). Follow-
ing the success of AlexNet, VGG (Simonyan & Zisserman,
2014) architectures were proposed with smaller convolu-
tional kernel sizes. Thanks to their simple architecture,
VGG architectures are still popular today in many computer
vision approaches. In order to overcome problems with
vanishing gradients in deep architectures, He et al. (2016)
proposed ResNet architectures, introducing the usage of
residual layers. These residual architectures were later ex-
panded upon and are currently some of the most frequently
used architectures for solving a variety of problems in the
field of deep learning (Xie et al., 2017; Hara et al., 2018).
Given the history of the aforementioned architectures in the
field of adversarial machine learning, as well as in other
deep learning areas, we opted for the use of AlexNet, VGG-
16, and ResNet-50 in our experiments.
3. Experimental Setup
Generating adversarial examples Carlini & Wagner
(2017) demonstrated the fragility of adversarial examples
generated by single-step attacks and argued that iterative at-
tacks should be used for evaluating novel defenses. Iterative
attacks calculate and add perturbation to the input iteratively
according to the rule
Xn+1 =Xn + Pn , (1)
whereXn and Pn represent the input and the perturbation
generated at the nth iteration, respectively. In this study we
generate the perturbation as follows:
Pn = α sign
(∇xJ(g(θ,Xn)c)) , (2)
where∇xJ(g(θ,Xn)c) represents the gradient with respect
to X obtained with the cross-entropy loss (J) when tar-
geting the class c. We use α = 0.004 as the perturbation
multiplier which approximately corresponds to changing
the pixel values of images by 1/255 at each iteration and
perform this attack for 250 iterations. Typically, adversarial
attacks such as FGS, IFGS, and PGD enforce a constraint
on the magnitude ‖X − X˜‖p of the perturbation. However,
in order to make a valid comparison between adversarial ex-
amples in terms of L0, L2, and L∞ norms, we only enforce
a discretization constraint, thus ensuring that the produced
adversarial examples can be represented as valid images
(i.e., the pixel values of X˜ lie within the range [0, 1], as can
be expected from regular images).
Localizing adversarial perturbation In a previous re-
search effort (Ozbulak et al., 2019), we successfully used
the Hadamard product to select target pixels for generating
adversarial examples in the context of semantic segmenta-
tion (Ozbulak et al., 2019). In order to localize the pertur-
bation to selected regions, we employ a similar approach in
this research effort, making use of
Xn+1 =Xn + Pn L , (3)
where L is a localization mask, i.e., a binary tensor of
the same shape as the input. In this tensor, regions where
the perturbation needs to be applied are set to 1 while the
remainder is set to 0.
Perturbation regions In this study, we evaluate the use
of three different perturbation regions, each with three dif-
ferent settings. These regions are (1) randomly selected
pixels, (2) center square pixels, and (3) outer frame pixels.
For (1), we randomly select {45%, 28%, 17%} of all pixels,
where these percentages approximately correspond to a cen-
ter square with a side length of {90, 120, 150} pixels and an
outer frame with a width of {20, 34, 58} pixels, respectively.
Thus, the number of selected pixels for all regions in each
of the three different settings is virtually the same. Visual
examples of the localization masks are provided in Figure 3
in Appendix A.
Calculating Lp distances We calculate Lp distances (p =
0, 2,∞) between genuine images and their adversarial coun-
terparts, similar the calculations in Papernot et al. (2015) and
Carlini & Wagner (2017). A detailed description of these
calculations for our settings is also provided in Appendix A.
4. Experiments
We first analyze model-to-model transferability (also called
black-box transferability) for adversarial examples with lo-
calized perturbation. For each model-to-model pair, we
generate 2, 000 adversarial examples that transfer from the
source model to the target model. Using the same initial
images as these adversarial examples do, we now apply per-
turbation to nine different regions (i.e., three regions, with
each region coming with three different settings). In Fig-
ure 2, we present the percentage of adversarial examples that
transfer from model to model when localized perturbation
is applied, as opposed to performing the adversarial attack
without any localization constraints. We see that a large
portion of adversarial examples maintains model-to-model
transferability when perturbation is applied to local regions.
For the adversarial examples that maintain model-to-model
transferability, Table 1 provides exhaustive details on the
mean and standard deviation of the L2 and L∞ properties
of the produced adversarial examples. L0 norms are omitted
from this table because adversarial examples with regional
perturbation almost always have reduced mean L0 norms
(Figure 5 and Table 2 in Appendix B). Adversarial pertur-
bation applied to the center square of an image reduces the
mean L2 norm while it increases the mean L∞ norm. How-
ever, with additional experiments, we discover that 43%
of the individual adversarial examples with localized per-
turbation have lower L∞ distances than their non-locally
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Figure 2. Percentage of adversarial examples with localized perturbation that transfer from source model (generated from) to target model
(tested against) when 17%, 28%, and 45% of pixels are selected, respectively (combining all 3 localization approaches).
Table 1. Mean (standard deviation) L{2,∞} distances calculated between genuine images and their adversarial counterparts, with the
adversarial counterparts created by localization of perturbation (see the first column). Adversarial examples are created from the source
models listed in the first row and transfer to the target models listed in the second row.
L
oc
al
iz
at
io
n Source: AlexNet VGG-16 ResNet-50
Target: VGG-16 ResNet-50 AlexNet ResNet-50 AlexNet VGG-16
Norm: L2 L∞ L2 L∞ L2 L∞ L2 L∞ L2 L∞ L2 L∞
No Localization 7.35 0.07 6.39 0.05 6.91 0.07 3.62 0.02 6.79 0.07 3.76 0.02
(5.37) (0.08) (4.50) (0.06) (4.17) (0.05) (3.16) (0.04) (4.31) (0.06) (2.20) (0.02)
C
en
te
r
90px 6.55 0.15 5.33 0.11 4.01 0.10 3.41 0.09 3.54 0.09 2.79 0.06
(4.36) (0.14) (3.52) (0.10) (2.64) (0.09) (2.77) (0.10) (2.54) (0.09) (2.23) (0.07)
120px 6.47 0.11 6.30 0.10 5.01 0.10 3.68 0.06 4.50 0.09 3.70 0.06
(4.48) (0.11) (4.45) (0.11) (2.99) (0.08) (3.05) (0.07) (2.93) (0.08) (3.09) (0.08)
150px 6.80 0.10 6.46 0.09 6.71 0.11 3.92 0.05 6.64 0.11 4.65 0.07
(4.48) (0.10) (4.33) (0.09) (3.79) (0.08) (3.07) (0.06) (3.90) (0.08) (3.54) (0.07)
Fr
am
e
20px 9.86 0.18 10.1 0.20 6.07 0.16 4.64 0.12 4.77 0.13 4.32 0.11
(8.37) (0.20) (7.94) (0.21) (3.74) (0.14) (3.61) (0.15) (2.88) (0.12) (2.90) (0.11)
34px 8.92 0.13 8.63 0.13 6.71 0.15 4.50 0.08 5.68 0.12 4.85 0.10
(6.60) (0.13) (6.52) (0.14) (4.04) (0.12) (2.96) (0.08) (3.25) (0.09) (3.44) (0.10)
58px 8.44 0.12 7.23 0.09 7.79 0.14 5.44 0.08 7.02 0.12 5.78 0.09
(5.72) (0.13) (4.94) (0.11) (4.17) (0.09) (3.89) (0.09) (3.90) (0.09) (3.79) (0.08)
R
an
do
m
17%
8.11 0.15 7.41 0.13 5.20 0.13 4.43 0.10 4.59 0.10 3.81 0.08
(5.63) (0.16) (4.63) (0.14) (3.14) (0.11) (3.30) (0.12) (2.65) (0.09) (2.92) (0.09)
28%
6.82 0.10 7.51 0.11 5.97 0.12 4.29 0.07 5.50 0.11 4.35 0.07
(4.99) (0.12) (4.54) (0.11) (3.55) (0.10) (2.91) (0.07) (3.14) (0.09) (3.02) (0.08)
45%
7.42 0.10 6.76 0.09 7.21 0.12 4.61 0.06 7.39 0.12 5.04 0.07
(4.80) (0.11) (4.20) (0.09) (3.98) (0.09) (3.41) (0.07) (4.03) (0.08) (3.53) (0.07)
perturbed counterparts, showing that localized perturbation
nevertheless reduces the L∞ norm for a large number of
cases. The detailed breakdown of this analysis can be found
in Appendix B.
Another important observation we make is the difference in
perturbation for different regions. As can be seen, not all re-
gions are equally important when it comes to manipulating
the prediction of a DNN with adversarial perturbation. We
clearly observe adversarial perturbation applied to the cen-
ter square being more influential than perturbation in other
regions. Surprisingly, applying perturbation to randomly
selected pixels requires less distortion than applying it to
the frame of an image, further highlighting the differences
between important and unimportant regions. Allowing per-
turbation in a more condensed area versus a more expanded
area provides different results for the center square region
and the other two regions. Increasing the number of selected
pixels in the center square region also increases the L2 norm
of the perturbation, while doing so for frame and random
pixels reduces the aforementioned norm.
5. Conclusion and Future Directions
We have proposed a simple and general method for localiz-
ing perturbations generated by existing adversarial attacks
to specific image regions. Our method is experimentally
confirmed to be effective, maintaining high black-box trans-
ferability at distortion levels that are significantly lower than
the distortion levels required by existing attacks. The reduc-
tion in the amount of perturbation achieved by our method
raises the concern that existing adversarial defenses may be
undermined, since these are usually designed to be effective
only against non-local attacks requiring larger perturbation
budgets.
Our main priority for future work is (1) to investigate to
what extent our localization method can fool state-of-the-art
adversarial defenses as well as (2) to more precisely identify
regions of importance where this localized perturbation can
be made more effective, linking the observations made in
this study to the interpretability of DNNs.
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A. Experimental Details
Center square
localization
16.1% 28.6% 44.8%
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localization
17.0% 28.0% 45.0%
Frame
localization
17.0% 28.0% 45.0%
Figure 3. The localization masks used in this study. The given
percentages correspond to the number of selected pixels compared
to the total number of available pixels.
Perturbation regions In Figure 3, we provide visualiza-
tions of the selected localization masks, where the given
percentages correspond to the proportion of selected pixels
out of all available pixels.
Note that for the perturbation localized on the image frame,
unlike Zajac et al. (2019), we do not expand the size of the
image. We simply exercise the perturbation on the selected
outermost pixels.
Calculating Lp distances Between initial images of size
224× 224 and their adversarial counterparts, we calculate
L0, L2, and L∞ distances as follows:
L0(X, X˜) =
∑224
i
∑224
j 1{Xi,j−X˜i,j 6=0}
224× 224 , (4)
L2(X, X˜) = ||X − X˜||2 , (5)
L∞(X, X˜) = max(|X − X˜|) , (6)
where X and X˜ represent an initial image and its adver-
sarial counterpart, respectively. In this framework, an L∞
norm of 1 means, added perturbation has changed a pixel
from black to white (i.e., 0 to 255), or vice versa. An L0
norm of 1 means all pixels are modified with the adversarial
perturbation.
No localization Center Frame Random
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Figure 4. L0, L2, and L∞ distances between the initial images
and their adversarial counterparts for the adversarial examples that
originate from the same initial image but that were perturbed using
different localization methods. All of the adversarial examples
successfully transfer to models they are not originated from.
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Figure 5. The percentage of adversarial examples with regional perturbation that have less perturbation in terms of L0 norm (top), L2
norm (middle), and L∞ norm (bottom) compared to their counterparts with “global” perturbation. Percentages are calculated based on the
adversarial examples with localized perturbation that transfer from source model to target model.
B. Additional Experimental Results
In Figure 4, we provide a number of qualitative examples,
showing the L0, L2, and L∞ norms of adversarial perturba-
tion generated using various localization settings. All of the
examples presented in Figure 4 are generated using AlexNet
and transfer to ResNet-50.
For the experiments discussed in the main paper, Fig-
ure 5 provides the percentage of adversarial examples that
have lower Lp norm than their counterparts generated with
“global” perturbation. Our experiments show that regional
perturbation almost always leads to lower L0 norms com-
pared to non-regional perturbation, whereas in the case of
L2 and L∞ norms, this depends on the initial image-target
class combination.
For the sake of completeness, In Table 2 we provide the
exhaustive details of L0 norms of adversarial perturbations
for the experiment described in the main paper. Since the
perturbation region is what is controlled in this experiment,
the resulting perturbations have much less L0 deviation
compared to L2 or L∞.
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Table 2. Mean (standard deviation) L0 distances calculated between genuine images and their adversarial counterparts, with the adversarial
counterparts created by localization of perturbation (see the first column). Adversarial examples are created from the source models listed
in the first row and transfer to the target models listed in the second row.
L
oc
al
iz
at
io
n Source: AlexNet VGG-16 ResNet-50
Target: VGG-16 ResNet-50 AlexNet ResNet-50 AlexNet VGG-16
Norm: L0 L0 L0
No Localization 0.93 0.94 0.90 0.84 0.89 0.83
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
C
en
te
r
90px 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
120px 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
150px 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.41
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Fr
am
e
20px 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
34px 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
58px 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.42
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
R
an
do
m
17%
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
28%
0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
45%
0.44 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.41
(4.80) (0.11) (4.20) (0.09) (3.98) (0.09)
